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The regulatory reforms of the last twenty years in network industries for the promotion of competition,
have typically involved the vertical separation (ownership or functional) of potentially competitive seg-
ments, which have been gradually deregulated, from remaining naturally monopolistic segments which
continue to be subject to price, network access, service quality and entry regulations. The performance
of these regulated naturally monopolistic segments is of considerable economic importance, on account
of the e⁄ects on the performance of the competitive segments when the regulated segments provide the
infrastructure platform upon which the competitive segments rely. From this point of view a critical role
is played by the regulatory mechanisms used to determine the access price, namely the price at which
downstream competitors can acquire the essential input.
A regulatory mechanism widely applied in network industries is the access price cap which only sets
the maximum price (cap) that the upstream monopolist is allowed to charge for each network element,
leaving price discretion below it.
Price cap regulatory mechanisms are usually advocated in industries characterized by cost uncertainty
and asymmetric information since they are easy to implement, require low information and, breaking the
link between prices and realized costs, provide the ￿rm with optimal incentives to undertake managerial
e⁄ort.
However, in network industries where reliability considerations are of great political relevance, when
there is uncertainty about the regulated ￿rm￿ s cost opportunities, the regulator will have to set a relatively
high ￿xed price to ensure that if the ￿rm is indeed inherently a high cost type, the cap will be high enough
to cover the ￿rm￿ s (e¢ cient) realized costs. This could lead to ￿excessive pro￿ts￿also when the reduction
in costs is due to exogenous reasons and not to the e¢ cient behavior of the ￿rm; in this case the pro￿t is
a pure informational rent due to an informative advantage of the ￿rm. Accordingly, the e¢ ciency gains
promised by price cap regulation have to be balanced with the unavoidable higher informational rent that
would have to be given up.
This main dranwback of the price cap regulation has led to the proposal of modi￿cations aimed at
redistributing to consumers part of ￿rms￿pro￿ts when considered excessive. These modi￿cations have
assumed the form of a pro￿t-sharing contract, where a share of pro￿ts is rebated to consumers through
lump sum transfers, or of a sliding scale regulatory mechanism where the price that the regulated ￿rm
can charge is partially responsive to change in realized costs and partially ￿xed ex ante (Schmalensee,
1989; Lyon, 1996). Regardless of the manner in which earnings are shared, the requirement to share
earnings with consumers reduces the ability of the regulated ￿rm to pro￿t from regulatory ignorance or
favourable cost shock, but at the cost of weakening the regulated ￿rm￿ s incentives to minimize operating
costs (Mayer and Vickers, 1996; Sappington, 2002; Hawdon et al., 2007).1 One of the results of the
1It is worth noticing that, in a dynamic context, the price cap mechanism itself involves some form of pro￿t sharing,
albeit with a lag, through the price reviews that periodically occur. As highlighted by the economic literature (see Mayer
2empirical literature (see Schmalensee, 1989; Gasmi et al.,1994) is that higher levels of uncertainty and,
thereby, of asymmetric information, tend to increase the welfare desirability of pro￿t-sharing plans; this
e⁄ect is particularly strong if the regulated ￿rm must be guaranteed non-negative pro￿ts in all states of
nature and when consumer surplus is of a much greater social value to the regulator than ￿rms￿pro￿ts.2
This paper highlights another e⁄ect generated by the adoption of a pro￿t-sharing plan in an integrated
network industry characterized by a regulated upstream monopolistic market with cost uncertainty and
an unregulated downstream market with Cournot competition. It will be shown that, under an access
price cap regulatory mechanism, the transfer of a su¢ ciently high share of access pro￿ts to consumers
makes it pro￿table for an integrated upstream monopolist to disclose to his downstream rival the privately
acquired information on the upstream cost and this, in turn, may negatively a⁄ect welfare.3 In this case,
a trade-o⁄ may result whenever the regulator is more concerned about consumer surplus than about
￿rms￿pro￿ts.
The aim of the present paper is to analyse how information acquisition and transmission issues a⁄ect
the determination of the optimal access pro￿t-sharing plan. The main result reached is that the opti-
mal pro￿t-sharing plan will depend on the variance and on shape of cost distribution, on information
acquisition costs as well as on the regulator￿ s concern about ￿rms￿pro￿ts compared to consumer surplus.
I consider a stylized model with an integrated network industry characterized by an upstream mar-
ket, which is a regulated natural monopoly with cost uncertainty and an unregulated downstream market
which is a Cournot duopoly. The upstream monopolist is regulated through an access price cap mech-
anism with access pro￿t-sharing which sets the price the upstream monopolist has to charge for the
essential input sold to his downstream rival and rebates a constant share of access pro￿ts to consumers.
The structure of information is endogenously determined; indeed, the true value of the upstream cost
can be observed by the upstream monopolist only through an investment of resources. This is quite
a reasonable assumption in industries as complex as utilities where the measurement of the economic
costs of network elements is a di¢ cult undertaking for the ￿rm itself on account of the forward-looking
nature of these costs which requires a costly prediction of the evolution of technological and demograph-
ical characteristics.4 The information acquisition is prohibitively costly both for the regulator and the
and Vichers, 1996), introducing cost pass-through in the price control formula (explicit pro￿t-sharing) and shortening the
lag between price reviews (implicit pro￿t-sharing) are substitutes for satisfyng redistributive concerns, keeping the incentives
the same.
2An innovative menu of sliding scale mechanisms was adopted in 2004 by the electricity regulator in the UK (OFGEM)
to cover the costs of distribution companies with the aim of reducing the asymmetric problem faced by the regulator
concerning future capital requirements, and, thereby, of reducing the level of cap which allows ￿rms to undertake the
necessary investments to satisfy the reliability target (see Ofgem, 2004 and Crouch, 2006).
3Information-sharing issues arising in oligopolistic markets have been extensively analyzed by economic literature which
has shown that the incentives of ￿rms to share information on demand and costs as well as the welfare implications of
information-sharing depend on both the nature of the competition (Cournot versus Bertrand) and on the nature of the
initially dispersed information (random shocks predominantly a⁄ecting all ￿rms or shocks a⁄ecting individual ￿rms). See,
among others, Kuhn and Vives (1995) and Raith (1996) for a comprehensive review.
4This argument has been used by the Energy Network Association (ENA, 2006) in response to the regulator￿ s proposal
of introducing a sliding scale mechanism to cover the distribution costs in the electricity industry. Indeed, it argued that
obtaining reliable forecasts of capital costs is a money and time consuming task for the ￿rm because the appropriate
investment programme mainly depends on variables such as customer growth rates, load growth rates, equipment age and
3downstream ￿rm who, however, are able to deduce whether or not the upstream monopolist is informed.
The upstream monopolist is assumed to commit ex-ante, before the observation of the true cost realiza-
tion, to an information transmission decision rule, namely to reveal to his rival all information or to keep
it private; there is no cost of information transmission and information is veri￿able by the downstream
rival.5
In consideration of the above, this paper will determine the optimal share of access pro￿ts rebated to
consumers when the regulator￿ s objective function is a weighted sum of the expected consumer surplus
and ￿rms￿pro￿ts. Firstly, it will show that the transfer of a high share of access pro￿ts to consumers
may induce the upstream monopolist to precommit to fully reveal to his rival the information acquired
and this transmission e⁄ect may, in turn, boost her incentives to acquire information.
This result can be explained as follows. When the rival becomes informed on the upstream cost, he
adjusts his output accordingly. This adjustment has two opposite e⁄ects on the upstream monopolist￿ s
expected pro￿ts. On the one hand, it increases the variability of the upstream monopolist￿ s equilibrium
output, which, in turn, raises the expected pro￿ts obtained in the downstream market. This result is
in line with those obtained by the literature on information-sharing which shows that ￿rms competing
in an unregulated Cournot market with a homogeneous good ￿nd it pro￿table to symmetrically share
information about their own costs (see Fried, 1984; Shapiro, 1986; Raith, 1996).6 On the other hand,
the rival￿ s output variability, caused by information transmission, reduces the expected access pro￿ts
which the monopolist obtains from selling the essential input. This result strictly depends on the access
price cap breaking the link between access price and cost, which gives a linear access revenue in the cost
parameter.
It follows that the greater the share of access pro￿ts transferred to consumers, the more information
transmission is likely to increase the upstream monopolist￿ s expected pro￿ts and, thereby, his gain from
acquiring information. It will be shown that whether or not the upstream monopolist￿ s (ex-ante) infor-
mation transmission decision a⁄ects his information acquisition decision will depend on the value of the
information acquisition costs.
On account of the above results, the optimal access pro￿t sharing plan will be determined by taking
into account the welfare e⁄ects of information transmission as well as the welfare gain which is generated
replacement expenditure with few necessary connection with the historical trends.
5On account of the above, the assumption that the ￿rm voluntarily precommits to an extreme transmission rule, i.e.
full transmission or full concealment, is not restrictive. Indeed, the economic literature has shown that, even without
precommitment, there are conditions under which one of these extreme disclosure regimes emerges endogenously from the
strategic information-sharing choices of the ￿rms (see Ziv, 1993). The results of the literature is that if it is known that
￿rms have information and disclosure is costless and veri￿able, then strategic ￿rms will disclose all information since they
cannot credibly conceal unfavourable news (see Darrough, 1993; Milgrom, 1981; Okuno-Fujiara et.al.,1990; van Zandt and
Vives, 2007). Instead, if it is possible to verify the information but not to ￿nd out if the ￿rm is informed, then the ￿rms
can selectively disclose acquired information (see Gigler, 1994 and Jansen, 2008).
See also note 11 for a justi￿cation of the precommitment assumption referred to the present context.
6Fried (1984) explores the ￿rm￿ s incentives to produce and disclose information on the duopolist￿ s cost functions; Shapiro
(1986) analyzes the pro￿t and welfare e⁄ects of cost sharing in standard oligopoly models; Raith (1996) proposes a general
model.
4by the redistribution of access pro￿ts to consumers whenever the regulator is more concerned about
consumer surplus than about ￿rms￿pro￿ts.
I will show that only when the regulator is equally or almost equally concerned about consumer surplus
and ￿rms￿pro￿ts, information transmission may generate a welfare gain whenever it induces information
acquisition. In this case, the optimal access pro￿t-sharing plan will require that all access pro￿ts be
rebated to consumers. Instead, if information transmission does not a⁄ect information acquisition or
if ￿rms￿pro￿ts are less socially valuable than consumer surplus, information transmission generates a
welfare loss. In this case a trade-o⁄ will occur. On the one hand, the transfer of all access pro￿ts to
consumers, inducing information transmission, causes a welfare loss; on the other, reducing the share of
access pro￿ts transferred to consumers may eliminate this welfare loss but at the cost of reducing the
welfare gain due to the redistribution of pro￿ts. Therefore, whenever welfare loss due to information
transmission prevails over welfare gain due to the redistributive e⁄ect, the optimal access pro￿t-sharing
plan will require that a share of access pro￿ts be retained by the upstream monopolist to reduce his
incentives to reveal information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model, derives the equilibrium
levels of output under Cournot competition and analyzes the regulator￿ s choice of the access price cap.
Section 3 analyses the upstream monopolist￿ s incentives to acquire and transmit information under an
access price cap regulatory mechanism with access pro￿t-sharing. Section 4 investigates the welfare e⁄ects
of information transmission (4.1) and determines the optimal access pro￿t-sharing plan (4.2). Section 5
concludes the paper. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 The model
I consider a stylized model within an integrated network industry characterized by an upstream market,
which is a regulated natural monopoly with cost uncertainty, and an unregulated downstream market
which is a Cournot duopoly. It is assumed that there is only one ￿rm operating in the downstream market
apart from the upstream monopolist￿ s a¢ liate.7





; it has density function f(￿) and distribution function F(￿) which are common
knowledge; ￿0 and ￿2 denote the mean value and the variance of the distribution of ￿; respectively. The
realizations of ￿ can be interpreted as the result of exogenous technological changes and any cost-reducing
investment is assumed away. The upstream monopolist (she) is regulated through an access price cap
mechanism with access pro￿t-sharing which sets the price the upstream monopolist has to charge for the
essential input sold to her downstream rival (he) and rebates, through lump sum transfers, a constant
7This assumption does not a⁄ect the results of the paper. Entry issues are assumed away because they go beyond the
aim of the paper.
5share of access pro￿ts to consumers.8 The downstream market is characterized by a linear inverse demand
function: P(Q) = d￿Q: For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the technology used to produce the
downstream output only requires the essential facility. Therefore, the cost of producing the ￿nal good is
equal to the marginal cost of producing the essential input for the integrated upstream monopolist, since
the access price paid by her subsidiary is merely an internal transfer, while for the downstream ￿rm the
cost of producing the ￿nal good is the regulated access price.
The structure of information is as follows. The realization of ￿ is initially unknown to both the regu-
lator and the ￿rms. The upstream monopolist, however, can learn the true realization of ￿ if she invests
a ￿xed amount of resources, denoted by K; otherwise she observes nothing. Instead, the information
acquisition is prohibitively costly for the regulator and for the downstream ￿rm.9 As the information ac-
quisition cost K and the upstream monopolist￿ s strategy are common knowledge, there is no uncertainty
about whether or not the upstream monopolist is informed.
It is assumed that the upstream monopolist precommits to a decision transmission rule, namely, to
fully reveal to her downstream rival all information acquired or to keep it private, before having observed
the true realization of ￿; there is no transmission cost, the revealed information is veri￿able by the rival at
a negligible cost and, thereby, the revelation is truthful.10The regulator cannot enforce either information
acquisition or transmission decisions.11
8I consider an access price cap mechanism without donward ￿exibility, i.e. the upstream monopolist is not allowed to
charge the access monopoly price whenever it is below the access price cap. This is equivalent to assuming that the demand
and cost distribution functions are such that the monopoly access price is greater than the access price cap for all values of
the cost parameter and for any share of access pro￿ts rebated to consumers.This assumption helps to focus on the e⁄ects
of an access pro￿t-sharing plan on the upstream monopolist￿ s incentives to transmit information to her rival which would
be excluded if the upstream monopolist charged the monopoly access price.
It is also assumed that the integrated upstream monopolist cannot strategically manipulate her pro￿ts by reporting access
pro￿ts as downstream pro￿ts. This assumption does not a⁄ect the results qualitatively.
9It is worth noticing that, even if the rival had the know-how to acquire information on the upstream monopolist￿ s cost,
he would prefer to remain ignorant. Indeed, the value of information on ￿ for a ￿rm is given by the di⁄erence between
the expected pro￿ts if she acquires information and sets her output on the true realization of ￿ and the expected pro￿ts
if she remains ignorant and sets her output on the expected value of ￿ (under linear demand function). Since the pro￿t
function of the upstream monopolist￿ s rival is concave in ￿, the value of information on ￿ is negative for him. Obviously,
the information on ￿ increases the rival￿ s ex-post pro￿t and, thereby, the upstream monopolist￿ s information transmission
is desirable for him.
10The revelation is not public so the regulator cannot learn the value of the cost. The assumption of the veri￿ability of
the revealed information by the rival can be justi￿ed by the fact that he has been operating on the market for a considerable
time.
11In the light of the results of the economic literature on information- sharing (see note 5), the assumption that the
upstream monopolist voluntarily precommits to an extreme transmission decision rule rather than to decide ex-post after
having observed ￿; can be justi￿ed as follows. First, notice that an increase in the rival￿ s output a⁄ects the upstream
monopolist￿ s pro￿ts in two opposite ways: on the one hand, it reduces the upstream monopolist￿ s output and, thereby, her
downstream pro￿ts; on the other, it increases the demand for the essential input which, in turn, raises the access pro￿ts.
It is easy to show that when the access price cap is always binding, as in this paper, the upstream monopolist￿ s pro￿t
decreases with the rival￿ s output which, in turn, increases with the upstream monopolist￿ s cost. Therefore, if the upstream
monopolist did not precommit to a transmission decision rule, but made her decision after having observed ￿, she would
choose to reveal only the lowest value of the cost. In this case, if no information was revealed, not being attributable to
lack of information, the rival would deduce that the cost was higher than the lowest and would set his output on the basis
of the average of these values. On account of this, the upstream monopolist will prefer to disclose the true value of the
cost whenever it is below the average of the non-disclosing values rather than be judged worse than the average. Since
non-disclosure is interpreted as being the worst type, the upstream monopolist will be forced to disclose. Therefore, since
the present paper assumes that there is no uncertainty on whether or not the upstream monopolist is informed, that there is
no transmission cost and that the information is veri￿able, it follows the ex-ante precommitment decision to full disclosure
and the ex post decision will prove to be equivalent.
Following the above reasoning, it can be argued that if the upstream monopolist ￿nds it pro￿table to precommit to
6Consider now the payo⁄ of the ￿rms, net of the information acquisition cost. Denoting by ￿ the share
of the access pro￿ts transferred to consumers, with ￿￿[0;1], the upstream monopolist￿ s pro￿t function is
given by
￿M = (d ￿ Q ￿ ￿))qM + (1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ ￿)qR (1)
where QI = qM + qR; and qMand qR denote the quantity produced by the upstream monopolist and
the rival ￿rm in the downstream market, respectively; a denotes the access price cap set by the regulator.
The pro￿t function of the rival is
￿R = (d ￿ Q ￿ a)qR (2)
The welfare function is the sum of the net consumer surplus, the share of the access pro￿ts rebated
to consumers and the ￿rms￿pro￿ts which are weighted by a coe¢ cient ￿; with ￿￿[0;1]; the regulator￿ s






+ ￿(P(Q) ￿ ￿)Q) ￿ ￿￿K + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(a ￿ ￿)qr
￿
dF(￿) (3)
with ￿ = 1 under information acquisition and ￿ = 0 without information acquisition.
The timing of the game is the following. 0) Nature chooses ￿. 1) The regulator optimally sets the
access price cap and the share of access pro￿ts rebated to consumers. 2) The upstream monopolist decides
whether to pay K to acquire information on ￿ and, before having observed ￿, whether to transmit it to
her downstream rival. 3) Firms in the downstream market simultaneously choose their quantities on the
basis of the information available to them as a consequence of the information decisions made in (2); the
access price is paid and the optimal share of access pro￿ts is rebated to consumers.13
The derivation of the equilibrium output levels is given in the appendix.
In the ￿rst stage the regulator sets the access price cap and the optimal share of access pro￿ts rebated
to consumers. The access price cap is found by maximizing the expected welfare function (3), evaluated





which means that the access price cap should not be lower than the long-run marginal cost of
keep information private rather to fully disclose it, she will have no incentive to ex-post undermine this decision after
having acquired information by revealing favourable cost values and concealing the most unfavourable. Indeed, if the
precommitment were not binding, the rival would anticipate the strategic partial disclosure of the upstream monopolist
and, therefore, he would deduce from the concealment of information that the cost were high. Therefore, the upstream
monopolist would be forced to disclose. In the light of this, the upstream monopolist has incentives to give credibility to
the precommitment decision to no disclosure whenever this decision is, ex ante, preferable to full disclosure.
12The welfare function is given by
￿
S(Q) ￿ P(Q) + ￿￿M + ￿￿R ￿ ￿￿K + ￿(a ￿ ￿)qr
￿
where S(Q) indicates the gross consumer surplus with S(Q) ￿ P(Q) =
Q2
2 :Substituting for eqs (1) and (2) in the above
expression gives (3).
13Attention is restricted to access price cap regulatory mechanisms under which the upstream monopolist always agrees
to produce. This gives a non-negativity constraint on the upstream monopolist￿ s pro￿t for each realization of ￿:
7the essential input.14Since the welfare function decreases with the access price, it follows that a = ￿ for
all ￿￿[0;1] and K:15
The next section will analyse how the adoption of an access pro￿t-sharing plan a⁄ects the upstream
monopolist￿ s decisions to acquire and transmit information. By taking into account the welfare e⁄ects of
these decisions, section 4 will determine the optimal access-pro￿t sharing plan.
3 Information acquisition and transmission incentives
This section analyses the incentives of the upstream monopolist to acquire and transmit information on
the upstream cost under an access price cap mechanism with access pro￿t-sharing. Firstly, there will be
an analysis of the upstream monopolist￿ s incentives to transmit to her rival the information acquired;
then a calculation of the upstream monopolist￿ s value of information, as a function of the information
transmission decision.
Information transmission allows the upstream monopolist￿ s downstream rival to adjust his output
to the true realization of ￿, which, in turn, a⁄ects the upstream monopolist￿ s pro￿ts. The upstream
monopolist will ￿nd it pro￿table to precommit to fully reveal to her downstream rival the information
acquired on ￿ if the expected pro￿ts obtainable from transmitting information are no lower than those
obtainable from keeping the information private. This is stated in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Under an access price cap mechanism with access pro￿t-sharing, for all ￿ ￿ 0;42 the upstream
monopolist does not ￿nd it pro￿table to precommit to fully transmit to her rival the information on ￿,
while for all ￿ > 0;42 she ￿nds it pro￿table to do so.
The economic intuition of Lemma 1 lies in the fact that the transmission of information has two
opposite e⁄ects on the upstream monopolist￿ s expected pro￿ts. On the one hand, it increases the expected
downstream pro￿ts obtained by the upstream monopolist from selling her output in the downstream
market. On the other hand, the information transmission reduces the expected access pro￿ts obtained
from selling the essential input to her rival at the access price cap.
14This condition is usually justi￿ed, both by academic scholars and practitioners, with the need to favour good investments
in the upstream market, ensuring the recovery of the related costs. It is worth noticing that ￿M(￿;a;￿) > 0 at a = ￿
, because of the positive downstream pro￿ts due to the imperfect competiton characterizing the downstream market.
Therefore, for the participation constraint to be binding, namely ￿M(￿;a;￿) = 0, the regulatory mechanism should set
a < ￿: The exclusion of this rule is due to two reasons. First its implementation could require so much information as to
make it prohibitively costly its adoption by the regulator. The second reason is connected with the aim of the present paper
as I explain below. Under an access price cap a < ￿ the adoption of an access pro￿t-sharing plan would lead to the sharing
of access losses with consumers for high values of ￿ creating two opposite e⁄ects on welfare. On the one hand, the sharing
of losses would lead to a reduction in consumer income. On the other, it would increase the upstream monopolist￿ s pro￿ts,
thereby causing a reduction in the access price cap required to satisfy the ￿rm￿ s participation constraint: The following
analysis will ignore these opposite welfare e⁄ects in order to isolate those related to information acquisition and transmission
issues.
15Notice that, since the welfare function decreases with a; whatever the Cournot equilibrium output, the access price cap
value does not depend on the upstream monopolist￿ s information acquisition and transmission decisions.
.
8The key to understanding intuitively the e⁄ects on downstream expected pro￿ts is to realize that,
whether or not the information is transmitted to the rival, the downstream expected pro￿ts of the












Due to linear demand, information transmission does not a⁄ect the expected equilibrium quantity of the
upstream monopolist; while it increases the variance of the equilibrium output. Indeed, if the rival ￿rm
learns that the cost of the upstream monopolist is higher (lower) than expected, it will produce more
(less) in equilibrium. These strategic adjustments to the true realization of ￿ increase the variability in
the upstream monopolist￿ s equilibrium output, which is bene￿cial to the ￿rm.
On the contrary, the rival￿ s output variability caused by information transmission reduces the expected
access pro￿ts. This strictly depends on the access price cap breaking the link between access price and
cost which gives linear access revenues in ￿: As a consequence, the information transmission does not
a⁄ect the expected access revenues, while it raises the upstream monopolist￿ s expected costs of supplying
the access.
The above analysis implies that the greater the share of access pro￿ts transferred to consumers (i.e.,
the greater ￿), the more likely it is that information transmission increases the upstream monopolist￿ s
expected pro￿ts and that the upstream monopolist chooses to transmit information.
In the light of Lemma (1), the upstream monopolist￿ s incentives to acquire information on ￿ will
depend on her information transmission decision which, in turn, is determined by the share of access
pro￿ts rebated to consumers.
Indeed, for ￿ ￿ 0;42, the upstream monopolist prefers to incur an information cost K to observe ￿
and adjust her output accordingly rather than to remain ignorant and sets her output on the expected
value of ￿; if
E￿M(￿;￿0;a;￿) ￿ E￿MN(￿;￿0;a;￿) ￿ K
where E￿M(￿;￿0;a;￿0) and E￿MN(￿;￿0;a;￿) denote the upstream monopolist￿ s expected pro￿t func-
tions under information acquisition and under ignorance, respectively. For ￿ > 0;42; the upstream
monopolist ￿nds it pro￿table to acquire information and transmit it to her downstream rival rather than
to remain ignorant if
E￿M(￿;a;￿) ￿ E￿MN(￿;￿0;a;￿) ￿ K
where E￿M(￿;a;￿) denotes the expected pro￿ts under information acquisition and transmission.
Denote by K1 the value of K solving E￿M(￿;￿0;a;￿)￿E￿MN(￿;￿0;a;￿) = K1 for ￿￿[0;0;42] where
K1 = ￿
2
4 and by K2(￿) the value of K solving E￿M(￿;a;￿)￿E￿MN(￿;￿0;a;￿) =K2(￿), for ￿￿(0;42;1]
where K2(￿) = ￿
2







Thus, the following Lemma is obtained
9Lemma 2 i)If ￿ ￿ 0;42; the upstream monopolist ￿nds it pro￿table to acquire but not to transmit
information for all K ￿ K1; while she prefers to remain ignorant for all K > K1: ii) If ￿ > 0;42; she
acquires and transmits information for all K ￿ K2(￿) and she remains ignorant for all K > K2(￿):
The economic intuition of Lemma 2 is the following. i)In the light of Lemma 1, when a share of access
pro￿ts lower than 0;42 is rebated to consumers, the upstream monopolist does not ￿nd it pro￿table to
transmit to her rival the information acquired. In this case the information has a value for the ￿rm
because it allows her to adjust her output to the true value of ￿:The greater the variance of the cost
parameter, the greater the increase in pro￿ts arising from the output adjustment and, therefore, the
greater the gain from acquiring information. Besides, when the rival is ignorant, the access pro￿ts are
the same whether or not the upstream monopolist is informed. In this case, the upstream monopolist￿ s
value of information does not depend on the access pro￿ts and so it does not alter, whatever the share
of access pro￿ts transferred to consumers.
ii) Instead, for ￿ > 0;42; information transmission increases the upstream monopolist￿ s expected
pro￿ts which, in turn, raises the ￿rm￿ s gain from acquiring information as opposed to the case in which
the rival remains ignorant. Besides, this increase in the upstream monopolist￿ s value of information is
greater, the greater ￿ (
@K(￿)
@￿ > 0 for ￿ > 0;42):
4 Welfare analysis
The adoption of an access pro￿t-sharing plan a⁄ects welfare (given in 3) in two ways. On the one hand,
the transfer of access pro￿ts to consumers has a positive welfare e⁄ect in all those cases in which the
regulator is more concerned about consumer surplus than about ￿rms￿pro￿ts (￿ < 1). I will call this e⁄ect
the redistributive e⁄ect generated by the adoption of an access pro￿t-sharing plan. On the other hand,
in the light of Lemmas 1 and 2, the adoption of an access pro￿t-sharing plan may a⁄ect the upstream
monopolist￿ s decisions to acquire and transmit information which, in turn, alter the equilibrium output
levels and, through this, a⁄ect welfare. The determination of the optimal access pro￿t-sharing plan will
take into account both the welfare e⁄ects of information transmission and the redistributive e⁄ect.
4.1 Welfare e⁄ects of information transmission
This section will analyse the welfare e⁄ects of information transmission induced by the adoption of an
access pro￿t-sharing plan.
Let b K(￿)￿(K1;K2(1)), the following Lemma is obtained.16
Lemma 3 i)For K ￿ K1; information transmission generates a welfare loss which increases with the
variance of the cost parameter (￿2); and decreases with the regulator￿ s concern about ￿rms￿ pro￿ts
16K2(1) = K2(￿) for ￿ = 1: As will be shown in the Appendix (proof of Proposition 4) ￿ = 1 maximizes welfare on the
range of ￿￿(0;42;1] where there is information transmission.
10(￿). ii)For K￿(K1;K2(1)], information transmission generates a positive welfare loss if ￿￿[0;0;9] or
if ￿￿(0;9;1] and K > b K(￿); a negative welfare loss (i.e. a welfare gain) if ￿￿(0;9;1] and K < b K(￿):
Moreover, this welfare loss increases with ￿2 for ￿￿[0;0;5] and decreases with ￿2 for ￿￿(0;5;1].
The economic intuition of Lemma 3 is as follows.
i)On the range of K ￿ K1 the only e⁄ect of information transmission is to allow the upstream
monopolist￿ s rival to adjust his output to the true realizations of ￿: These adjustments, increasing the
variability of the rival￿ s equilibrium output, lead to a reduction of the expected access pro￿ts which,
in turn, reduces the expected consumer transfers as opposed to the case in which the rival is ignorant.
This reduction, which increases with the variance of the cost parameter, has a negative e⁄ect on welfare
whenever consumer surplus is more socially valuable than ￿rms￿pro￿ts (namely, the lower ￿) and it
disappears when they are socially valuable to the same extent (i.e. for ￿ = 1). I will call this negative
welfare e⁄ect, the transfer-reducing e⁄ect of information transmission. Besides, the adjustments of the
rival￿ s output to ￿ cause a reduction in the variability of the industry equilibrium output, which, reducing
both the expected industry downstream pro￿ts and the expected consumer surplus, further contributes
to decreasing the expected welfare.17 The greater the variance, the greater the reduction in the industry
output variability and, thereby, the greater the welfare loss due to information transmission.
ii) Let us now consider the range of K￿(K1;K2(1)] where the upstream monopolist￿ s ex-ante decision
to transmit to her rival the information on ￿ makes it pro￿table for her to acquire information: In
this case information transmission generates three welfare e⁄ects. First, the negative transfer-reducing
e⁄ect again occurs, which increases with the variance of the cost parameter (￿2) and decreases with
the welfare weight attached to ￿rms pro￿ts (￿): Second, information acquisition and transmission allow
￿rms to adjust their output levels to the true realization of ￿ which, in turn, raises the variability of
the industry equilibrium output and, thereby, increases both the expected net consumer surplus and the
expected industry downstream pro￿ts. This welfare gain increases with ￿2 and ￿: I will call this positive
welfare e⁄ect, the information e⁄ect. Third, information acquisition involves an additional cost, namely
K￿(K1;K2(1)]; for the upstream monopolist compared to the case of no information acquisition and
transmission. This causes a welfare loss which increases with ￿: I will call this negative welfare e⁄ect,
17As previously explained, when the rival is informed, his equilibrium output increases (decreases) if the upstream cost
is higher (lower) than expected and this, in turn, reduces (increases) the upstream monopolist￿ s output as opposed to the
case in which the rival is ignorant. Since the direct e⁄ect of information transmission on the rival￿ s output is stronger than
its counter-e⁄ect on the upstream monopolist￿ s output, information transmission reduces the sensitivity of the industry
equilibrium output to ￿:Using (4) and (5) de￿ned in the appendix, the equilibrium output levels, when the information on
￿ is transmitted to the rival, can be written as
qM(￿;a) = qM(￿;￿0;a) ￿
￿￿￿0
6 ;qR(￿;a) = qR(￿0;a) +
￿￿￿0
3
Q(￿;a) = Q(￿;￿0;a) +
￿￿￿0
6
where qM(￿;￿0;a), qR(￿0;a) and Q(￿;￿0;a) are the equilibrium output levels under no information transmission. The
above eqs clearly show that the direct e⁄ect of information trasmission on the rival￿ s output￿ measured by 1
3￿ is greater
than its counter-e⁄ect on the upstream monopolist￿ s output ￿ measured in the absolute value by 1
6: As a consequence, since
@Q(￿;￿0;a)
@￿ < 0 , information transmission reduces the sensitivity of industry output by 1
6:
11the acquisition cost e⁄ect.
When the regulator is much less concerned about ￿rms￿pro￿ts than about consumer surplus, i.e.
￿￿[0;0;5]; the negative transfer-reducing e⁄ect more than compensates the positive information e⁄ect.
As a consequence, on account of the negative acquisition cost e⁄ect, information transmission generates
a welfare loss which increases with ￿2.
The increase in the welfare weight attached to ￿rms pro￿ts, namely ￿￿(0;5;0;9]; lowers the negative
tranfer-reducing e⁄ect and raises the positive information e⁄ect so that a net positive welfare e⁄ect is
produced, which increases with ￿2. This welfare gain, however, is more than compensated by the negative
acquisition cost e⁄ect: As a consequence, information transmission generates a welfare loss which decreases
with ￿2:
Only when the regulator is equally or almost equally concerned about ￿rms￿pro￿ts and consumer
surplus, namely ￿￿(0;9;1]; the welfare gain due to information acquisition more than compensates the
welfare loss due to both the transfer-reducing e⁄ect and the information acquisition e⁄ect for the lowest




). In this case information transmission produces a welfare gain
which increases with ￿2:
4.2 Optimal access pro￿t-sharing plan
This section will determine the optimal access pro￿t-sharing plan (i.e. the optimal value of ￿ denoted
by ￿￿) by taking into account both the welfare e⁄ects of information transmission and the redistributive
e⁄ect generated by the transfer of access pro￿ts to consumers. This e⁄ect, measured by ￿(1￿￿)(a￿￿0)qr;
decreases as ￿ increases and disappears when ￿ = 1, namely when the social value of consumer surplus
and ￿rms￿pro￿ts is equal. Besides, it is positively related to the expected access pro￿ts obtainable by
the upstream monopolist for each unit of input sold to the rival which, in turn, is greater, the greater
the di⁄erence between the access price cap (a) and the mean value of the cost distribution. Since the
access price cap is equal to the highest value of the cost parameter (a = ￿), it follows that the more (less)
right-skewed the cost distribution, the higher (the lower) the mean value of the cost distribution and,
thereby, the lower the expected access pro￿ts for each unit of input sold.18
In the light of the above analysis, the following Propositions are obtained.
Proposition 4 When information transmission does not induce information acquisition; the greater the
variance of the cost and the more right-skewed the cost distribution, the less the transfer of all access
pro￿ts to consumers is socially desirable. Moreover, if the regulator is equally or almost equally concerned
about ￿rms￿ pro￿ts and consumer surplus, the optimal pro￿t-sharing plan will require that a share of
access pro￿ts be retained by the upstream monopolist, whatever the variance of the cost.
18Right -skewed cost distribution refers to cases where the probability of cost-reducing technological changes is greater
when the cost is high than when the cost is low. Intuitively, this is likely to characterize sectors with very complex technology
exhibiting a form of decreasing return to scale, where the greater the number of realized technological improvements, the
lower the probability of realizing any others.
12The economic intuition of Proposition 4 is the following.
From Lemma 3, when the upstream monopolist￿ s ex-ante decision to transmit information does not
a⁄ect her information acquisition decision, namely when K ￿ K1; information transmission generates a
welfare loss which increases with the variance of the cost parameter. Therefore, a trade-o⁄ occurs. On
the one hand, as shown in Lemma 1, the transfer of all access pro￿ts to consumers induces the upstream
monopolist to transmit to her rival the information acquired on ￿ and this a⁄ects welfare negatively. On
the other, the reduction in the share of access pro￿ts transferred to consumers (i.e. ￿ ￿ 0;42) eliminates
the welfare loss due to information transmission, but it also reduces the positive redistributive e⁄ect
occurring when a regulator is more concerned about consumer surplus than about ￿rms￿pro￿ts (i.e.
￿ < 1): As discussed above, this e⁄ect is positively related to the access pro￿ts obtainable for each unit
of essential input sold, which, in turn, are lower the more right-skewed the cost distribution. It follows
that the greater the variance of the cost and the more right-skewed the cost distribution, the more likely
it is that the optimal pro￿t-sharing plan will require that a share of access pro￿ts be retained by the
upstream monopolist (i.e. ￿￿ = 0;42). If the regulator is equally concerned about ￿rms￿pro￿ts and
consumer surplus, namely for ￿ = 1, the redistributive e⁄ect disappears and, as a consequence, ￿￿ =
0;42, whatever the value of ￿2:
Proposition 5 When information transmission induces information acquisition, if the regulator is (not)
much more concerned about consumer surplus than about ￿rms￿pro￿ts, the greater the variance of the
cost and the more (less) right-skewed the cost distribution, the less (more) the transfer of all access pro￿ts
to consumers is socially desirable. Instead, when the regulator is equally or almost equally concerned about
consumer surplus and ￿rms￿pro￿ts; the optimal pro￿t-sharing plan will require, for the lowest values of
the information acquisition costs, that all access pro￿ts be rebated to consumers.
Let us consider the range of K￿(K1;K2(1)] where the upstream monopolist￿ s ex-ante decision to
transmit to her rival the information on ￿ makes it pro￿table for her to acquire information. From Lemma
3, information transmission generates a welfare loss for ￿￿[0;0;9] which increases with the variance of
the cost parameter when the regulator is much less concerned about ￿rms￿pro￿ts than about consumer
surplus (i.e. ￿￿[0;0;5]) and it decreases with the variance when ￿rms￿pro￿ts are more socially valuable
(i.e ￿￿(0;5;0;9]): Since the only way for the regulator to make information transmission unpro￿table for
the upstream monopolist is to reduce the share of access pro￿ts transferred to consumers, it follows that
the more uncertain the cost distribution, the less (more) the transfer of all access pro￿ts to consumers is
socially desirable for ￿￿[0;0;5] (for ￿￿(0;5;0;9]): Besides, the more right-skewed the cost distribution,
the lower the welfare gain arising from the redistribution of pro￿ts to consumers and, thereby, the lower
the likelihood that ￿￿ = 1 for ￿￿[0;0;9]:19
19The appendix gives a more pecise characterization of the optimal pro￿t-sharing plan. In particular, conditions are
found which ensure that ￿￿ = 0;42 for ￿￿[￿1;0;5] with ￿1 > 0 and ￿￿ = 1 for ￿￿(0;5;￿2] with ￿2 < 1, whatever the value
of ￿2:
13If the regulator is equally or almost equally concerned about ￿rms￿pro￿ts and consumer surplus,
namely for ￿￿(0;9;1], as shown in Lemma 3, information transmission produces a welfare gain for K <
b K(￿). In this case the optimal access pro￿t-sharing plan will require the transfer of all access pro￿ts to
consumers (i.e. ￿￿ = 1) even in the absence of any redistributive e⁄ect (i.e. ￿ = 1):
Proposition 6 In the absence of information transmission and acquisition, the optimal pro￿t-sharing
plan requires the transfer of all access pro￿ts to consumers, whenever the regulator is more concerned
about consumer surplus than ￿rms￿pro￿ts, and the transfer of any share of access pro￿ts if consumers
surplus and ￿rms￿pro￿ts are socially valuable to the same extent.
When the upstream monopolist ￿nds it pro￿table neither to acquire nor transmit information, namely
when K > K2(1); the transfer of access pro￿ts to consumers generates a welfare gain whenever the
regulator is less concerned about ￿rms￿pro￿ts than about consumer surplus (￿ < 1): In this case the
optimal pro￿t-sharing plan requires that all access pro￿ts be rebated to consumers. Instead, when the
regulator is equally concerned about consumer surplus and ￿rms￿ pro￿ts, the adoption of an access
pro￿t-sharing plan does not a⁄ect welfare, whatever the share of access pro￿ts transferred to consumers.
5 Conclusion
This paper has determined the optimal access pro￿t-sharing plan in integrated network industries char-
acterized by an upstream natural monopoly with cost uncertainty regulated through an access price cap
mechanism and an unregulated downstream Cournot duopoly. In this context I have shown that the
requirement to share a su¢ ciently high amount of access pro￿ts with consumers may a⁄ect the upstream
monopolist￿ s incentives to acquire and transmit the information on the upstream cost to her downstream
rival and this, in turn, a⁄ects welfare. On account of these e⁄ects the optimal pro￿t-sharing plan will de-
pend on the variance and shape of the cost distribution, on the value of the information acquisition costs
as well as on the regulator￿ s redistributive concerns. I have shown that for low information acquisition
costs, the transfer of all access pro￿ts is never desirable when the regulator is equally concerned about
consumer surplus and ￿rms￿pro￿ts, namely in the absence of any redistributive concern. Instead, for high
information acquisition costs, it is precisely when the regulator is equally or almost equally concerned
about consumers surplus and ￿rms￿pro￿ts that the optimal access pro￿t-sharing plan may require the
transfer of all access pro￿ts to consumers.
When consumer surplus is more socially valuable than ￿rms￿pro￿ts a trade-o⁄ occurs between the
welfare loss due to information transmission and the welfare gain due to the redistribution of pro￿ts
to consumers. I have shown that in highly dynamic network industries characterized by technologies
exhibiting some forms of decreasing returns of scale, if the information acquisition costs are low or if
both the information acquisition costs and the regulator￿ s redistributive concerns are high, the welfare
loss due to information transmission is likely to prevail over the positive welfare redistributive e⁄ect. In
14these cases the optimal access pro￿t-sharing plan requires that a share of access pro￿ts be retained by
the upstream monopolist.
A possible implication of the analysis carried out in this paper is that an access pro￿t-sharing plan
might perform better in network industries where the upstream monopolist is not allowed to produce in
the downstream market. Indeed, in separated network industries, as there is no transmission e⁄ect, the
requirement to share access pro￿ts with consumers would a⁄ect welfare positively whenever the regulator
is more concerned about consumer surplus than about ￿rms￿pro￿ts.
The analysis carried out in this paper has assumed away any cost-reducing activity and, thereby, has
excluded the negative e⁄ect produced by the requirement to share pro￿ts with consumers on the ￿rm￿ s
incentives to minimize costs. A possible extension of the paper could be to analyze the performance of
pro￿t-sharing and sliding scale mechanisms in di⁄erent industrial structures when the negative incentive
e⁄ect is also present.
6 Appendix
Equilibrium analysis
Let us ￿rst consider the case in which the upstream monopolist has acquired information on the
upstream cost and transmitted it to the rival. The maximization of (1) w.r.t. qM and of (2) w.r.t. qR
yield the equilibrium variables in the downstream market as a function of ￿ and a
qM(￿;a) =
d ￿ 2￿ + a
3
;qR(￿;a) =
d ￿ 2 a + ￿
3
;Q(￿; a) =
2d ￿ a ￿ ￿
3
; (4)
Let us then consider the case in which the upstream monopolist chooses not to disclose information on
the upstream cost to her downstream rival who, as a consequence, will set his output so as to maximize his
expected pro￿ts E￿R; with ￿R given by (2) where the expectation is taken over ￿: Cournot competition
























Finally, when the upstream monopolist does not acquire information, she will choose qM so as to
maximize E￿M with ￿M de￿ned by (1) and her rival will choose qR so as to maximize E￿R where the
expectations are taken with respect to ￿. The equilibrium output levels under no information acquisition
are
qM(￿0;a) =
d + a ￿ 2￿0
3
; qR(￿0;a) =




2d ￿ a ￿ ￿0
3
15Proof of Lemma 1. Lets ￿M(￿;a;￿) and ￿M(￿;￿0;a;￿) the upstream monopolist￿ s pro￿t functions
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Taking the expectation of (7) and subtracting the expectation of (8), yields





















=@￿ > 0 and E￿M(￿;a;0;42) ￿ E￿M(￿;￿0;a;0;42) = 0
￿
Proof of Lemma 2 Substituting for (6) in (1) and taking the expectation yields
E￿MN(￿;￿0;a;￿) =
￿
d + a ￿ 2￿0
3
￿2
+ (1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ ￿0)
￿




Taking the expectation of (8) and subtracting (10), by using Taylor￿ s expansion yields




By adding (9) and (11) we have










Proof of Lemma 3 Let us ￿rst derive the regulator￿ s objective function, denoted by EW(￿;K;￿;a;￿):
In the light of Lemmas 1 and 2, it is given by (3) evaluated at di⁄erent equilibrium output levels according






+ ￿E(P(F(￿;￿0;K;￿;a)) ￿ ￿)F(￿;￿0;K;￿;a) +
(1 ￿ ￿)￿E [(a ￿ ￿)f(￿;￿0;K;￿;a)] ￿ ￿K
where the functions F(￿;￿0;K;￿;a) and f(￿;￿0;K;￿;a) are so de￿ned:
F(￿;￿0;K;￿;a) = Q(￿;￿0;a) for K ￿ K1, ￿￿[0;0;42]








for K ￿ K2(￿), ￿￿[0;0;42]
for K > K2(￿), ￿￿[0;1]
￿
= qR(￿;a) for K ￿ K2(￿), ￿￿(0;42;1]
with Q(￿;￿0;a) and qR(￿0;a) de￿ned in (5) Q(￿0;a) and qR(￿0;a) de￿ned in (6); Q(￿;a) and qR(￿;a)
in (4): ￿ = 0 if K￿(K1;K2(￿)] and ￿￿[0;0;42] or if K > K2(￿) and ￿￿[0;1]; ￿ = 1 otherwise.
The welfare e⁄ects of information transmission, denoted by ￿WT(￿;￿2;K); are given by the di⁄er-
ence between the expected welfare function evaluated at the equilibrium output levels with information
transmission (i.e. ￿ > 0;42) and the expected welfare function evaluated at the equilibrium levels with-
out information transmission (i.e. ￿ ￿ 0;42); keeping ￿xed the share of access pro￿ts transferred to
consumers.
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￿WT(￿;￿2;K) = (￿0;4 + ￿0;3)￿2 < 0 (13)













￿[(P(Q(￿;a) ) ￿ ￿)Q(￿;a) ) ￿ (P(Q(￿0;a) ) ￿ ￿)Q(￿0;a) )]





￿WT(￿;￿2;K) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)0;33￿2 + (0;05 + ￿0;2)￿2 ￿ ￿K (14)
where the ￿rst negative term is the transfer-reducing e⁄ect, the second positive term indicates the infor-
mation e⁄ect and the third term, the acquisition cost e⁄ect. (8) can be written as
￿WT(￿;￿2;K) = 0;27(2￿ ￿ 1)￿2 ￿ ￿K for all K￿(K1;K2(1)] (15)
where ￿WT(￿;￿2;K) < 0 for ￿￿[0;0;5] with @￿WT(￿;￿2;K)=@￿2 < 0 :
Now consider the range of ￿￿(0;5;1]: Denote by b K(￿) =
￿
0;27(2￿ ￿ 1)￿2￿
=￿ the value of K￿(K1;K2(1))
which solves ￿WT(￿;￿2;K) = 0 with d b K(￿)=d￿ >0, b K(￿) ’ K1 at ￿ = 0;9 and b K(1) = 0;27￿2 <
17K2(1): Since @￿WT(￿;￿2;K)=@K < 0, it is easy to show that ￿WT(￿;￿2;K) < 0 if ￿￿(0;5;0;9] and









Moreover @￿WT(￿;￿2;K)=@￿2 > 0 for all ￿￿(0;5;1]￿
Proof of Proposition 4 The determination of ￿￿is carried out in two stages for K ￿ K2(￿).
First, maximizing EW(￿;K;￿;a;￿) w.r.t. ￿; separately for ￿￿[0;0;42] ￿ where there is no information
transmission￿ and for ￿￿(0;42;1]￿ where information transmission occurs￿ yields ￿ = 0;42 and ￿ = 1,
respectively. This result derives directly from the fact that the expected welfare is an increasing function
of ￿; for the same equilibrium output.




separately for K ￿ K1 and K￿(K1;K2(1)].
Let ￿W(K;￿2;￿) = EW(K;1;a;￿) ￿ EW(K;0;42;a;￿); then
￿￿ = 0;42 if ￿W(K;￿2;￿) ￿ 0
￿￿ = 1 if ￿W(K;￿2;￿) > 0
For K ￿ K1
￿W(K;￿2;￿) = ￿WT(￿;￿2;K) + 0;58(1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ ￿0)qR(￿0;a)
where ￿WT(￿;￿2;K) is de￿ned in (13). It follows that @￿W(K;￿2;￿)=@￿2 < 0 and ￿W(K;￿2;￿) <
0 at ￿ = 1: Besides , the more right-skewed the cost distribution function, the lower the value of (￿ ￿￿0)
and, thereby, being a = ￿; the more likely it is that ￿W(K;￿2;￿) < 0:￿
Proof of Proposition 5
For K￿(K1;K2(1)]
￿W(K;￿2;￿) = ￿WT(￿;￿2;K) + 0;58(1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ ￿0)qR(￿0;a) (17)
where ￿WT(￿;￿2;K) is de￿ned in (15). From the proof of Lemma 3 it follows that @￿W(K;￿2;￿)=@￿2 <





Besides, the more right-skewed the cost distribution function, the more likely it is that ￿W(K;￿2;￿) <
0 for all ￿￿[0;0;9]. More speci￿cally, for su¢ ciently right-skewed cost distribution functions such that
￿W(K1;0;0;5) = ￿K1 + 0;58(a ￿ ￿0)qR(￿0;a)) < 0
it follows that
￿W(K;￿2;￿) < 0 for ￿￿[￿1(K);0;5] ) ￿￿ = 0;42
18with ￿1￿(0;0;5) satisfying ￿W(K;0;￿1) = 0 and d￿1=dK < 0;
for su¢ ciently left-skewed cost distribution functions such that
￿W(K2(1);0;0;5) > 0
it follows that
￿W(K;￿2;￿) > 0 for ￿￿[0;5;￿2(K)] ) ￿￿ = 1
with ￿2￿(0;5;0;9] satisfying ￿W(K;0;￿2) = 0 and d￿2=dK < 0:￿




where EW(￿;K;￿;a;￿) is de￿ned in (12). Being @EW(￿;K;￿;a;￿)=@￿ > 0 for ￿ < 1, and
@EW(￿;K;￿;a;￿)=@￿ = 0 for ￿ = 1; it follows that ￿￿ = 1 for ￿ < 1 and ￿￿￿[0;1] for ￿ = 1￿
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